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I-INTRODUCTION
If one analyses the evolution of Morocco’s Growth Rate of GDP over the last two decades one notes that 
between in the beginning of the 1980’s there was a decline in the growth rate. The structural adjustment 
started in 1984 boosted the economy and growth rates increased up to 1990. The 1990’s being a period of 
quasi stagnation. 
This structural adjustments took the form of various economic policy measures which significantly increased 
the openness of the economy. These reforms aimed at reducing economic distortions and at promoting the 
higher growth rates urgently needed to reduce poverty and unemployment. 
Morocco relaxed price controls, achieved current account convertibility for residents and capital  account 
convertibility  for  foreign  investors,  launched a  broad  financial  sector  reform,  engaged in  a  program of 
privatization of public enterprises, liberalized its foreign trade and undertook a significant fiscal reform. 
The privatization objective was to ease the strain the state enterprises were putting on the state budget. The 
privatization law voted in 1989 authorized the transfer from the public to the private sector of a number of 
companies and hotels. The privatization really took off in 1993. 
The tax reform included the introduction of the value added tax in 1986, the establishment of the corporate 
tax in 1987, the adoption of the income tax in 1990, a reduction of tariffs and a frequent manipulation of the 
import  tax,  the  replacement  of  the  various  investment  codes  by  an  investment  charter  in  1996  and  a 
restructuring of the tax administration in 1991 (Sagou in Melanges, Collectif, 1999). 
The most important element in the liberalization of foreign trade is the signature of a free trade agreement 
with Europe. This agreement includes a progressive removal of tariffs to be completed in 2010 within twelve 
years. It is having and will continue to have an impact on the structure and evolution of revenues. In the 
1980’s the import  taxes represented about  twenty five percent of  current  receipts  (Claisse in  Melanges, 
Collectif, 1999). This percentage which has decreased to an average of nineteen percent in the beginning of 
the nineties is declining and is today around fifteen percent (Table 1A, 1B in the Appendix).
Despite the positive effect structural adjustment had on restoring macroeconomic equilibrium and reducing 
inflation  it  was  associated  with  a  heavy  deficit  on  the  social  sectors.  This  period  saw  an  increase  in 
unemployment, still high levels of illiteracy rate and poor health services.
The combination of  the deficit  on the social  grounds associated with the predictable  reduction of  tariff 
revenues due to the free trade agreement signed with Europe and the non renewal of the fish agreement 
forces us to ask whether the macroeconomic equilibrium (in particular the budget deficit) achieved through 
the structural adjustment program is sustainable.
Once the "incompressible" expenses (meaning here the wage and debt expenditures) are accounted for, very 
little is left to allow the government to influence in a 5 significant way the outcome of the budget. The ability 
to raise revenue beyond privatization proceeds being limited, the government intervention is expected to 
center around the implementation of institutional reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the budget 
procedures.  A number of measures are already underway: a  new finance organic law has been voted,  a 
reform of government bids has been undertaken and the way funds are transferred from the state to the local 
government has been revised. Other changes being discussed include a project to actually improve the system 
of funds control and a project on the globalization of ministry’s expenses. The object of the paper aims at 
evaluating the impact of some of these changes on the overall, allocative and technical efficiency of the 
budget. 
The purpose of the paper is to evaluate whether the Kingdom of Morocco can face a new fiscal situation, 
with increasing economic and trade liberalization and thus decreasing trade taxes, increasing demands to 
reduce social shortcomings and effectively continue to control its spending and deficit. 
The paper uses a new institutional economics approach to address this question. It will attempt to evaluate 
the  aggregate  discipline  and  the  allocational  and  technical  efficiency  of  the  budget  process  using  the 
questionnaire  developed  by  Hadi  Esfahani  (1999).  This  questionnaire  constructs  indices  of  institutional 
capability  using  information  on  the  country  budget  procedures.  The  questionnaire  will  also  be  used  to 
evaluate whether the ongoing reforms affecting the budget process have been sufficient to increase the ability 
of the government to contain the deficit. 
This study proceeds as follows. In section II, we describe the historical background of public finance in 
Morocco. Section III presents an overview of the budget and main related issues in particular the size of the 
state  owned  enterprise  and  the  decentralization  process.  The  fourth  section  reviews  the  budget  process 
currently being followed in Morocco. Section V discusses the recent changes that were introduced by the 
new organic  law.  Section  VI  assesses  the  effectiveness  of  the  budget  institutions  in  maintaining  fiscal 
discipline and being efficient in designing and implementing the budget and this effectiveness transformation 
by recent reforms.
II- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Morocco  did  not  have  a  budget  in  its  modern  meaning  until  1913.  However  a  financial  organization, 
attributed to the oumanas, was established under the reign of Moulay Slimane (1792-1822). According to 
Marchal  (1931)  these oumanas  were rich merchants recruited from Tetouan, Salé,  Rabat  and Fès.  They 
brought to public finance, accounting practices inspired from the ones they had known in merchant houses. 
However they did not elaborate a budget and did not make any estimate of expenses.
Amin El Oumama was the head of the oumanas corpus and could be considered as a real Minister of Finance 
even if it is only under the reign of the Sultan Moulay Hassan 1873-1894) that amin el oumanas took the title 
of  Ouzir  El  Malia.  He had under  his  supervision the amin of  the receipts  who perceived revenues and 
deposited them to the treasury, the amin of spending who paid the debts of the makhzen and the amin of 
accounts who controlled the accounts transmitted to the makhzen by the oumanas. 
To perceive the receipts and with the increased complexity of the accounts and services, a large variety of 
oumanas were established.  Every amin had to send every month to the makhzen a weekly statement of 
receipts and a monthly statement of account. Before leaving their positions the oumanas had to present a 
general statement which was given to the Sultan who then sent them to the beniqua, the equivalent of a 
government auditing office.
For the treasury, there was not a unique institution but various ones. Bit El mal El Mouslimin received all the 
receipts  from religious  taxes.  Dar  Adyil  received  all  the  products  of  administrative  contributions.  The 
Sultan's treasury received essentially donations made to the Sultan.
In  Muslim countries  the  taxation  originates  in  the  Koran  and the  collection  of  revenues  is  based  on  a 
principle of private and social solidarity. The first taxes were Zekat and Achour. With military conquests, 
tribute money and sovereignty taxes (Djezya, Kharadj etc…) became a new source of revenues. Finally, 
financial needs forced the Sultans to establish administrative contributions which have no religious nature 
and are called Meks. The protectorate maintained the existing taxes transformed some and created new ones1.
This system worked very well as long as the state was managed parsimoniously, however the costly reforms 
of the Sultan AbdelAziz (1894-1908) led to large debt. These debt, the interest of the European power in the 
access to Morocco's wealth and military interventions, led to the protectorate treaty in March 1912. Public 
finance played a very significant role in the protectorate. By a Cherifian message of November 25 1912, the 
Sultan Moulay Youssef (1912-1927) send to the caïds a "tertib"2 (regulation) to be applied in 1913. In 1915 
two organic dahirs codified the establishment, the rates and collection of this tax. The tertib stays in the 
Koran tradition since it continues the Zekat and Achour but also borrows heavily from the French legislation.
Up to 1910, even if taxes were collected (tariffs, Zekat and Achour), no budget was officially written. The 
first budget was regional and for the Chaouia region. In 1912 this budget was cut into local budgets and was 
extended  to  Meknes  (1912),  Rabat,  Fés  and  Marrakech  (1913).  In  1913-14  the  general  budget  of  the 
Cherifian empire was established. The rules of public accounting were clarified by a dahir in 1917 which 
specified the fundamental rules dealing with the elaboration and execution of the budget. This dahir was 
amended many times during the protectorate to be consistent with the French budget. 
Because  public  institutions  and the  budget  process  in  Morocco were  borrowed  from the  colonizer  and 
imposed in an environment where it created a "lag" between a traditional society and a more modern one it 
led to two of type of inefficiencies, those inherent to the borrowed system and those resulting from non 
internalization of the system.
In muslin tradition the caliph, as a head of the community of Muslims has all spiritual and temporal powers. 
This supreme power allows him to be above all institutions. It is only with the caliph Omar Ibn Khattab that 
the idea of power delegation appears but by this delegation the caliph does not relinquish his power. Morocco 
becoming a Sultanate in 1145 continues however to apply the principles of Muslim law. Justice was still 
given in Morocco in the name of the Sultan. Everything that deals with the administration of society goes to 
the Sultan who can delegate some of its powers to ministers. The right to reform muslin law (Chraa) belongs 
to the oulemas (legal experts) who, when asked by the Sultan, give an opinion called Fetoua. This tradition 
continues in Morocco but the power of oulemas has been reduced by the institution of Parliaments.
Before  and  during  the  protectorate  Moroccan  population  was  represented  by  assemblies  of  notables, 
representing the link between the population and the makhzen. Because of material problems associated with 
the organization of election after independence a national consultative council is created. This council was 
composed of four committees of which the budget committee. It  did not have an autonomous power of 
decision and lasted only from November 1956 to Mai 1959.
It is only in 1962, a few years after the end of the protectorate that Morocco had its first constitution. Largely 
inspired from the French one, it affirms a number of democratic principles such as separation of powers, 
national representation and multi party. Four other constitutions followed in 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996. 
Every constitution has a number of articles dealing with the finance or budget law.
In 1963 the first parliament was elected. It was an assembly composed of two chambers. This assembly was 
interrupted in June 1965 by the proclamation of the state of emergency. In 1970 a new constitution replaced 
that of 1962. It  substituted one chamber to the two chambers and in August 1970 a new assembly was 
elected. In 1971 and 1972 after the two military coups there was no representation until 1977. The 1977 
assembly was the first that finished its term. In 1984 the fourth assembly was elected. It was followed by new 
assemblies in 1993 and in 1997. The two chambers were reinstated by the 1996 new constitution.
The September 1996 constitution3 has introduced many innovations that are relevant to the budget. The bi-
cameral parliamentary system with two chambers was re-introduced with the Chamber of representatives 
(Chambre des representants) and the Chambers of advisors (Chambre des conseillers). The former is elected 
for five years and the latter for nine years (renewable for the third every three years) at the universal suffrage. 
The importance of the region as a local collectivity next to the prefecture, the provinces and the communes 
was  reinforced.  The  legal  status  of  the  government  auditing  office  (la  cour  des  comptes)  has  been 
strengthened. The concept of the development plan replaced that of an economic program. 
We will see below that many articles of this constitution (45, 50, 51, 55, 56 and 57) deal with the voting 
conditions and the potential amendments of the budget law.
The Parliament exercise  its  control on public finance.  The finance organic laws describe the process of 
adoption of the finance law and give the character of finance law to the annual finance law, the "rectificative" 
finance law and the "reglement" law. In pursuance of this finance organic law, a decree of application defines 
the  elaboration  and  carrying  out  of  budget  law.  Four  finance  organic  laws  have  been  in  effect  since 
independence: 1963, 1970, 1972 and 1998.
III - Overview of the budget and main related issues
1. Global trends
Following the phosphate  boom of  1975-1977 Morocco abandoned a  relatively conservative  approach to 
economic management and increased significantly both capital and current expenditure. The reversal in the 
terms of trade led to a significant budget deficit in the beginning of the 80’s financed mainly by heavy 
borrowing from abroad (Table 2) which increased total external debt. During 1983 to 1986 a macroeconomic 
stabilization program, continued until 1990 and including both contractionary fiscal and monetary policy 
measures was implemented. It has permitted a very sharp reduction in the budget deficit and at the same time 
a steady decline in inflation throughout the 1990’s (figure 1).
On the expenditure side, the capital expenditure has sharply declined since the beginning of the 80’s to 
stabilize at around five percent of GDP. In fact in the budget the capital expenditures are almost taken as a 
residual after the incompressible and other expenditure are met. The incompressible expenditure here are the 
central government wage bill and interest on public debt. Despite a timid introduction of incentive to leave 
for the workers of SOE and the non systematic replacement of retired workers, it is not expected that the 
wage bill can be reduced significantly. The efforts to manage the debt in a more efficient way has led to some 
positive results but not large enough to reduce the share of debt repayments as a percentage of total budget.
On the revenue side, the trade reform and the introduction of the VAT has first led to a reduction in total 
revenue between 1983 and 1986. After 1986 the important fiscal reform led to an increase in government 
revenues, however the free trade agreement signed with Europe and the non renewal of the fish agreement is 
expected to reduce these revenues significantly especially since trade revenues were and still are (even after 
their decline) an important share of total revenue.
The way in  which the budget  deficit  was  reduced and maintained at  a  reasonable  level  was  through a 
significant reduction in capital expenditure, which have been considered almost as residual expenditures once 
all other expenditures are met (figure 2).
It was also achieved through a freeze of salaries and a deterioration in the provision of social services. The 
latter has led to social pressure for better public services and rising demand for wage increases.
Further  this  reduction  of  the  budget  deficit  was  accompanied  by a  significant  restructuring  of  both the 
expenditure and revenues components of the state budget. The wages and debt reimbursement parts have 
increased despite efforts to reduce them making the incompressible part of the government expenditure equal 
to more than sixty percent of expenditures (Table 3A, 3B).
Given  the  composition  and  structure  of  the  budget  deficit  and  the  will  of  the  government  to  tackle 
shortcomings of the social sectors it is necessary, and this is recognized and expressed by the government, to 
improve the efficiency of the budget process.
2. The importance of state owned enterprises
The state owned enterprise are important with regards to the state budget because the state either receives 
funds from SOE when they are profitable or subsidizes this SOE when they can not raise sufficient revenues 
to cover their own expenses. The State pays the salaries of some SOE and the amount is included in the wage 
component of current expenditure. The State participates as well to the investment of SOE.. The privatization 
program aims, among other things, at reducing the state’s expenditures in terms of SOE subsidies.
There is a relatively large number of state owned enterprises in Morocco. The State is a majority holder in 
351 enterprises out of the 719 state enterprises. It holds one hundred percent of 244 enterprises and more than 
fifty percent of 107 other enterprises.
The state owned enterprise value added represent thirteen percent of GDP. The total investment of SOE 
represents about ninety percent of the investment included in the state’s general  budget and twenty two 
percent of the countries total investment. The SOE investment financing was realized for eighty percent 
through self financing, fifteen percent by the state and five percent by debt. This debt is in most cases the 
result of bilateral agreements and loans from multilateral institutions. The SOE total number of employees is 
around 200,000,  and is  equivalent  for  1997/98 to  forty  three percent  of  the state  general  budget  salary 
expenses.
The budget transfers from the state to the SOE went essentially to sectors that are perceived as priority 
sectors such as infrastructure, social sectors, agriculture, water and electricity. These transfers represent for 
97/98 two percent of GDP and almost six percent of the general budget total expenditure. These transfers 
went for twenty nine percent to current expenditure, for twenty seven percent to investment expenditures, and 
for twenty two percent to debt. The rest was directed toward restructuring and capital increase.
The transfers from the SOE to the state budget realized in 1997/98 represent about one percent of GDP. They 
come essentially from the products of monopolies and from the exploitation and financial participation of the 
state in the SOE (fifty percent) and from the products from financial institution (forty percent ).
To rationalize the working of the SOE sector the government has put in place measures to improve the 
governance of these enterprises. For example, the practice of auditing SOE has become usual practice and is 
conducted on an annual basis. The contractual agreement (defining relations between the state and the SOE) 
concerns the most important SOE and the role of the board of directors has been reinforced. The government 
is also trying to optimize the current and capital expenditures of SOE.
Finally the privatization program has permitted the transfer to the private sector of 56 units (34 enterprises 
and  22  hotels)  as  of  December  1998.  The  product  of  the  cessions  amounted  to  DH 13.5  billions.  The 
privatization program up to today concerned essentially profitable companies so it did not affect substantially 
the amount of capital and current subsidies made by the state to SOE (Table 4 and 5). The privatization 
process  will  eventually  lead  to  a  reduction  of  expenditures  allocated  to  subsidizing  SOE  when  the 
restructuring of the enterprises to be privatized is completed and more less profitable companies are sold to 
the private sector. It contributes to the budget revenues since 1995 for a small part of total revenues but the 
amount is expected to increase.
3- Decentralization
In  1976  the  "Charte  Communale"4 was  voted.  It  constitute  the  real  beginning  of  the  efforts  made  for 
decentralization. The subsidies system established before 1988 aimed a insuring that both the current budget 
and the investment budget were in equilibrium. This resulted from the fact that the local government current 
budget had, by law, to always be in equilibrium5 . This was insured by subsidizing local governments that 
showed a deficit through the "equilibrium subsidy". The distribution of this subsidy was based on what was 
called "estimated  deficit"  which  gave  an incentive  to  local  government  to  overestimate  the  deficit.  The 
investment budget was distributed arbitrarily.
In 1985 the law introducing the Value Added Tax6 was adopted. It stipulated in particular that thirty percent 
of the VAT receipts will go to the local government. It is only in 1988 that the first transfers of VAT receipts 
was conducted and up to 1995 the way the funds were transferred to the local government remained identical 
to the one prior to 1985.
It is only in 1996, twenty years after the promulgation of the Charte Communale that the system was revised 
by a  note  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior7 .  On the  financial  side  the distribution of  the VAT proceeds 
allocated to the local government is now for more than seventy percent alloocated in an automatic way on the 
basis of pre-established criteria. The two main criteria are the potential for the commune to raise taxes and 
the effort  made by the commune to  raise  taxe  .(these  criteria  are  used as  indication of  the  commune’s 
wealth).  The  remaining  resource  do  not  take  into  consideration  the  size  or  financial  situation  of  the 
commune.
Some problems remain, in particular the fact that the resources allocated to the local government are very 
small  compared to the responsibilities  that  have been transferred to them. The new system has had the 
advantage of changing the behavior of both the local government and of the authorities of the Ministry of 
Interior. According to a first attempt to evaluate the impact of the new procedures (Saddoug 1999) the local 
government were better able to plan their budget and the degree of autonomy in their decision improved. 
However the fact that the measure of the criteria’s used to decide the amount allocated to each commune 
.(taxe potential and effort) is not known to the commune and that a remaining part is allocated arbitrarily 
does not allow the local governments to predict their budget. A redefinition of the criteria used to attribute 
these receipts which would include population, level of development and equipment needs is under study at 
the Ministry of Interior (Rousset in melanges, Collectif, 1999). The VAT represents are increasing share of 
the local governments budget (Rhomari in Mellanges, Collectif, 1999).
It  is only when the local governments will  be able to predict their budget for the coming year, that the 
question of how to allocate this budget in a more efficient way and with a better involvement of the local 
government in the definition of needs will be answerable. For the moment the important decision seem to 
still be taken at the central level even if some attempts to increase the participation of the local governments 
are at a thinking stage. For example the construction of new schools is still decided on an annual basis by the 
Ministry of education , however a project (at an early stage) exist for the Ministry of education to have a 
convention with the local governments for the construction of schools.
IV. MOROCCAN BUDGET PROCESS
1. Budget structure
To take into account the importance of agriculture the budget covers a year starting July 1st. This periodicity 
dates from 1996 only (Table 6) even though it was recognized as the most appropriate as early as 1931. 
Marchal (1931) referring to a change of the budget law periodicity in 1931 points out: "For Morocco, the first 
of July would have been a better one"8. 
The budget document,  (thereafter  called budget  law, BL) gives  expenditures and revenues for the year, 
presenting them both as totals and for each spending department.
Since independence and up to 1992, the budgets were linked to multi-year economic plans of various length. 
Morocco had seven economic and social development plans of various length. They are those of 1960-1964; 
1965-1967; 1968-1972; 1973-1977; 1978-1980; 1981-1985 and 1988-1992. The plans were abandoned in 
1992 and a new economic plan was written for the period 1999-2003.
Before 1973 the plan was strictly applied. The 1973 budget law went beyond what was predicted in the plan 
due in part to the increased revenues resulting from the phosphate price increase. After 1978 the plan became 
a very ambitious project not necessarily achievable with the existing means. The lag between the plan and the 
budget law increased in the following years. In 1983, with the structural adjustment program the budget law 
became  more  realistic.  The  plan  was  not  anymore  since  1992  a  reference  for  the  elaboration  of  the 
investment budget which was drawn essentially on the basis of the priority programs, completion of existing 
projects,  the  continuation  and maintenance  of  public  works  and the  achievement  of  projects  for  which 
external financing was available. The idea with the 1999-2003 plan, to be voted in the October 1999 session 
of parliament is to draw an achievable goal but the plan financing will most likely be difficult to finance and 
resources will need to be found. 
The link between the plan and the budget law is explained in article 50 of the constitution which asserts that 
investment expenditures are voted only once, when the parliaments approve the economic plan. However the 
1998 organic finance law in article 24 specifies that approved plans give rise to a state commitment only 
within the limits stipulated in the annual finance law. In other words the vote of the plan doesn’t have a 
financial effect.
After the plan was abandoned in 1992, the budget was linked to a "note" forecasting the macro-economic and 
financial situation for the year. The strategic choices were given by His Majesty the King and these choices 
translated  into  projects  in  the  budget  law.  The  ability  and  the  dynamism of  the  different  ministries  in 
realizing the projects also influenced the repartition of resources. The technical ministries usually showing a 
greater ability in the use of resources compared to the social ministries. Structural adjustment programs and 
international agreements have limited the amount of borrowing.
The budget law includes the General Budget (GB), the special accounts of the Treasury (SAT) and some 
annexed budget (Table 7). The latter have been maintained only temporarily in the new organic finance law 
until a better management is found. 
The GB is divided in two parts. The first one presents revenues under an administrative and an economic 
classification.  The  second  one  concerns  both  operating  and  investment  expenditures  classified  under 
administrative  categories.  The  operating  expenditures  presented  in  section  I  of  the  GB  include  salary 
expenses and material and other expenses. The investment expenditures are presented separately in section II. 
Section III gives public debt expenses. It is in a separate budget document called "la morasse" that we find 
both  types  of  expenditure  detailed  administratively  by  chapter  (ministry)  and  article  (directorate); 
functionally by paragraph (program); and economically by line (specific activities within a program). The 
1989 new budget presentation aimed at: "becoming au instrument which will make the budgetary decision 
more clear, allow a better evaluation of the economic impact of the state budget and improve the internal 
management of services" (Ministry of Finance 1988). Each Ministry has chapters identified with a 4 number 
code.
In the Moroccan budget process, the allocation of resources to spending agencies gives them a ceiling that 
the government can not overrun. A rectificatory law is usually required if an amount above appropriation is 
sought.  The bases of "appropriation" is  very similar to the French one.  It  includes four steps:  the legal 
commitment (l'engagement); the verification and evaluation of the expense (la liquidation); the order to make 
payment (l'ordonnancement) and the payment. 
The ministers (ordonnateurs)9 can create the commitment for the state finance. The payment is made by the 
accountant. Usually commitments for which payments have prescrits are not anymore valid at the end of four 
years to avoid the accumulation of the state debt.
If for expenditure the BL is a ceiling authorized for spending, for revenues the BL is an obligation to collect 
all receipts provided for in the budget. 
The ministries (ordonnateurs) decide and fixe the amount of the expense for their departments, and for the 
annexed budget and special account of the treasury that are linked to them. They have a discretionary power 
(which they can delegate) but their legal status allows for political, civil and penal responsibilities.
The finance ministry in Morocco has a considerable amount of power . The "a priori" administrative control 
of the budget is done in Morocco by the CED (contrôle des engagements et dépenses) which is answerable to 
the finance minister10
This control deals with: (a) the accuracy of the expense, (b) if the expense is charged to the correct account, 
(c) the link of the committed expense to an available credit, (d) the adequacy of the expense estimation, (e) 
the legal regularity and, (f) the commitment potential repercussion on the use of total credit of the current and 
subsequent years.
After these verifications the financial controller has to give his approval, refuse it or make his comments 
known within  five  days  after  the  commitment  proposal  is  submitted.  In  Morocco,  the  approval  of  the 
financial controller may only be refused on specified grounds: credit is unavailable or insufficient; expense is 
not charged to the correct account; its estimation is clearly false, it violates existing financial arrangements; it 
does not obey or violate the text of the status of public workers. 
Next to this administrative control, there is the control done by la Cour des Comptes. This institution insures 
the superior  control  of  the execution of  the budget  law,  the regularity in the operations of  receipts  and 
expenses, the control and appreciation of the management of the organisms under its control and reports to 
His Majesty the King. The president of la Cour des Comptes is nominated by Dahir (El Baz in Melanges, 
Collectif, 1999). The reports made by la Cour des Comptes are not made available to the public. However in 
the project to reform la Cour des Comptes, which is expected to go through rapidly, it is explicitly said that 
the reports are to become available to the public.
Before  1998,  the  ministry  of  finance  also  had  de  facto  the  power  to  block  the  expenditure  of  "some" 
appropriations during the budget year if the government feared that the deficit would go beyond the one 
announced. The ministry of finance could go also beyond allocated credits for manpower expenditure and 
debt  expenditure.  The  1998  organic  law  reduced  significantly  the  ability  of  the  government  to  cut 
expenditure or overrun credits.
The central budget agency in Morocco today is "la Direction du Budget" which we will translate as the 
budget office (BO). The BO is part of the Ministry of Finance (MOF). If one looks at the November 1978 
Decree  dealing  with  the  attributions  and  organization  of  the  MOF,  the  BO included  four  departments: 
operating expenditures, investment expenditures, studies and coordination and local finance. An important 
change  was  introduced  in  1989.  Essentially  it  consisted  in  the  elimination  of  the  separation  between 
operating and investment expenditure and divided the BO by sectors with unified budgets. More recently in 
1997 in the context of a new re-organization a department of normalization of public expenditures was 
created in order to formulate norms permitting an improvement in credits allocation and follow up11 .
At the same time the personnel has been strengthened. The repartition of the total personnel shows that sixty 
percent of the persons working for the BO are senior staff that is have three to four years higher education or 
more12. The BO is reinforcing its computerization started in 1990.
2- Budget Planning
The baseline for spending discussions and decisions in morocco is the previous year's level of spending. 
During the last few years in fact the MOF has essentially offered to each spending ministry to renew previous 
years budget.
The arrival of the opposition13 in 1998 in government has somehow shaken the maintenance of the status 
quo. However the effective latitude allowed by funds available for repartition among spending ministers and 
thus the extent of conflict resolution remains limited. Estimates from finance ministry officials in Morocco, 
indicate that more that 90% of the budget is predetermined by decisions made in previous budget rounds.
In Morocco the budget takes into account expected changes of appropriations to accommodate automatic pay 
increases within the year as well as some announced price increases such as water, transport and electricity. 
If all price increases are not taken into account it is estimated that efficiency gains should compensate for 
them . 
The  estimation  of  operating  expenses  concerns  the  salaries  and  material  equipment.  The  evaluation  of 
manpower and estimated credits are based on the existing condition, the jobs created, the establishment of 
civil servants, the transformation of jobs and the measures of adopted texts. Other data is taken directly from 
the ordonnateurs for some specific categories of staff.
The estimation of material expenses concerns essentially current expenses of the department (maintenance, 
water, electricity, telecommunication etc...). 
The operating budget includes also the consolidated fund (Charge Commune) which is composed of the 
retirement and health benefits of civil servants and the subsidies of basic food commodities.
The investment expenditure estimation is based on the minimum program of ministries (projects already 
started) on new projects and by reference to economic development plans.
3- Budget Comprehensiveness
In the Moroccan budget two entities are outside the general budget. These are called the off budget accounts 
(Comptes Hors Budget) and the special account of the treasury (Comptes Speciaux du Tresor) and are not a 
derogation to the idea that money may not be spent unless it has been appropriated in the budget because they 
are controlled by parliament and voted at the same time as the budget law. 
The annexed budget concern state departments whose activities consists of producing goods and services that 
give rise to a payment. They have concerned the conservation foncière (land registration), the Moroccan 
radio-television, ports and the official printing agency.
Each budget is composed of two parts:  the first  one includes receipts and running expenses, the second 
investment expenses. The balance of the annexed budget appears in the general budget. The new finance 
organic  law of  1998 has  temporarily  maintained  the annexed budget  until  their  replacement  by  a  more 
appropriate management procedure, but they do not receive any subsidies. 
The special accounts of the treasury are accounts that aim at individualizing some activities that could be lost 
in the budget. The 1998 organic law reduced the SAT from 9 to 6 accounts (see Table 7) and strengthened 
the condition of their creation and management. Every SAT is managed under specific rules and keeps its 
balance that is rolled from one year to the next until it is definitely closed. The SAT are written and approved 
by the BL. The parliament votes these accounts one by one. About half of the SAT funds are VAT receipts 
which transit from these accounts before going to the local collectivities. Another important share of the SAT 
are funds originating in the various ministries budget and assigned for the purchase of land for ministries.
In Morocco there are various ways of presenting open ended expenditure within the budget: the vote and 
promulgation of a rectificatory law14 and the existence of some estimates that may be exceeded without new 
legislation. The credit limitatif constitutes a general principle. Two exceptions: the estimating credits (credits 
evaluatifs) which are credits covering the "object" rather than the amount of the expense and the provisional 
credits (credits previsionnels) which are difficult to fix ahead of time were included in the 1963 organic law. 
They were eliminated in 1972 but the facility was maintained for the reimbursement of debt (interest rate 
changes) and manpower expenditures. In 1998 these facilities were reduced. 
The debt service costs represent also a large share of Moroccan budget expenditure. If we include internal 
and external debt, the interest payment take up around twenty percent of the state expenditure (11).
4. Stages in the Budget Process
They are typically four stages in the budget process: planning, parliamentary, implementation and ex-post 
control. 
A. Planning Stage
The first stage is the planning process in government. It ends in the submission of a draft budget law to 
parliament. In Morocco this stage lasts between eight to ten month and can be divided in four steps.
• The first step, which starts early September, aims at preparing a first draft of the budget law. It consists of 
the budget expense estimation by the sectoral divisions of the budget directorate and of the estimation by 
various other directorates of the minister of finance and other ministries of tariff revenues (customs office), 
of tax revenues (tax office), of revenues from public enterprise (public enterprise office), and privatization 
receipts ( Ministry of Privatization). The revenues estimations take into account various parameters linked to 
the internal and international economic conditions. Based on these estimations, adjustments are made to limit 
the budget deficit to an acceptable level.
• The second step is the preparation of budget bids. It consists in the submission of the results of step one to 
government  validation.  This  validation  is  done  in  a  committee  of  ministers,  representing  the  different 
political parties of the government coalition, under the authority of the Prime Minister. The work of this 
committee lasts one or more weeks and usually reaches consensual proposals which are validated by the 
government. After this validation is obtained, the Prime Minister sends a letter to the different ministers to 
confirm the general orientations of the government that will serve as guidance for the establishment of their 
budgets. This letter is important and included for example for the draft BL of 1999-2000 a reference to the 
future Plan, the short term program of the government and the necessity to increase the competitiveness of 
the economy. For the latter it is stipulated that it is necessary to be rigorous in the management of the state 
revenues. At the same time a letter is send to the ministries specifying the limits within which their expenses 
have to be included. The MOF sends also a letter inviting his colleagues to communicate to the budget 
directorate their budget bids.
• The third step is the reconciliation and compilation of budget draft. After the spending ministries bids are 
received,  they  are  examined  and  discussed  in  bilateral  committees  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
involved ministries and of sectoral members of the budget directorate. Cases of dispute are brought to the 
arbitrage of the ministry of finance and the concerned ministry and if necessary to the Prime Minister. The 
results of the discussions of the spending ministries as well as the results of steps one and two are used to 
produce an almost final document of the BL.
•  The fourth step is the finalization of the budget proposal. The draft BL is submitted to the council of 
minister presided by His Majesty the King. This stage ends with the handing of the draft to parliament.
B. Parliamentary Stage
The  second  stage  is  the  parliamentary  stage  and  lasts  two  month  and  ten  days.  The  structure  of  the 
parliamentary stage will depend heavily on whether we have a bi-cameral parliament or a mono-cameral 
parliament. In Morocco the bi-cameral system is very recent. The first election of the second house was done 
in December 1997 and the new organic finance law was voted only in 1998. In Morocco, both houses have 
equal powers regarding the BL and reconciliation involving joint committee of both houses is planned for, if 
an agreement cannot be reached immediately. The second stage can be divided in three steps. 
• The first step consists of the submission of the BL to parliament. As soon as the draft BL is submitted it is 
immediately send to be studied by one of the parliamentary committee (Zhiri in Melanges 1999). The draft 
BL has to be put before one of the two assemblies at the latest seventy days before the end of the current 
financial year. The draft has to be examined successively by the two chambers to adopt a unique text. Every 
chamber has 30 days to adopt the text.
• The second step consists of the debate of the BL. The MOF has to present it in plenary session before both 
assemblies.  He  then  presents  it  again  before  the  finance  committee  and  answers  both  oral  and  written 
questions.
•  The third step includes the management of the amendments and the vote of the BL first in the finance 
committee  and  then  in  plenary  session.  It  is  essentially  during  the  committees15 study  that  budget 
amendments can be proposed (Zhiri in Melanges, Collectif, 1999). The amendments that can be made are 
restricted by the constitution which includes dispositions in various articles. The constitution specifies in 
article 51 that amendments formulated by members of parliament are not receivable when their adoption 
would lead to either an increase of expenditures or a reduction of revenues. Further article 57 stipulates that 
the members of each house and the government have the right of amendment. After the discussion is open the 
government can refuse to discuss an amendment that has not been presented to the parliamentary committees. 
The government can also call for a vote of the entirety or a part of the budget keeping only amendments 
proposed or accepted by the government. No amendment is receivable without the government agreement. 
The constitution stipulates in article 50 (and the organic finance law in article 35) that "In case the BL is not 
voted or promulgated at the end of the budget year, the government opens by decree the necessary credits to 
run public offices and to execute their missions according to the terms of the budget propositions submitted 
for approval. Receipts continue to be perceived according to the legislative and statutory arrangement in 
effect, to the exception however of receipts which suppression is proposed by the new BL. The receipts for 
which a reduction of rates was planed will be perceived at the new proposed rate".
C. The Implementation Stage
The implementation stage is primarily the responsibility of the MOF. The BL adopted by parliament, signed 
by the presidents of both houses is transmitted to the Prime Minister for signature. It is then promulgated by 
Dahir and published in the Bulletin Officiel.
Various changes have been made in the implementation stage by the 1998 organic law. These changes are 
described in Table 9 and discussed in the next section.
D. The Ex-post Control Stage
For all practical purposes the ex post control stage of a posteriori accountability is lacking in Morocco since 
the reglement law (Loi de Règlement) has never been voted before five years of the corresponding budget 
law16. Normally, within two years of the end of the BL, the settlement law approves the differences between 
the results and estimation of the BL. It actually sets the final receipts and expenses. They are usually big 
differences between estimation and realization. Concerning for example the settlement law of 1988, the error 
margin for public investment was thirty four percent, the government could only spend sixty six percent of 
the initial amount. For the social expenses the error margin was fifty five percent (Anas Bensalah Zemrani, 
1998). However a program to catch up on the delays has been drawn up. It aims at having a reglement law 
within the year for the 1999-2000 budget law.
IV. COMPARING THE BUDGET PROCESS BEFORE AND AFTER THE
REFORM
1. Changes in the 1996 constitution
In  the  historical  background it  was  seem that  the  September  1996 constitution  introduced at  least  four 
changes that are relevant for the budget : the plan, the region, the status of the government auditing office and 
the bi-cameral parliamentary system. The 1998 organic finance law and the decree of application of this law 
confirm these changes by including them in the budget process.
2. Changes in the budget process
Changes have been made in all stages of the budget process.
First in the government or planing stage the text is referring to the development plan and not to the social and 
economic program. The budget estimation and the preparation of the draft BL have more strict dates attached 
to them. It also lasts for a shorter time period.
Second, in the parliamentary stage the introduction of a bi-cameral parliamentary system has forced the 
increase in the number of days allocated to the examination of the draft BL. This increase in the total number 
of days should not hide the fact that each chamber has now in effect half the time it had before or one month 
instead of two. Also the reform gives a new role to the BL which is the safeguard not only of the financial but 
also of the economic equilibrium which it defines.
Third, in the implementation stage the expenditure management is significantly revised.
a) Some regulations has been strengthened to allow for a better control of the amount and use of funds.
Credit overrun has been strictly forbidden for salary expenses. If for example a salary raise is negotiated with 
the syndicates by a given ministry, the raise will have to wait for the coming year.
The use of funds in the item foreseen expenses and accrual appropriations is restricted.
The funds voted in the BL are not anymore automatically carried forward. It is now possible only to carry 
forward funds that have been committed by a contract. 
The annexed budget are to be eliminated and do not receive subsidies and the management of the SAT has 
been rationalized as well as their number of the reduced. The hiring of the non appointed person remunerated 
on the budget or the SAT has to be approved by the MOF.
b)  The  role  of  parliament  has  been  strengthened.  The  government  is  not  anymore  allowed  to  pen 
supplementary credits during the financial year without the habilitation of the parliament and the parliament 
has to be informed of any expense suspension.
c) The management of some items has been made easier through the softening of regulation.
The credit  transfer among articles and paragraphs require norms only a departmental  order of the MOF 
instead of a decree of the PM.
The financial aid management is facilitated by the possibility to launch projects as soon as an agreement has 
been reached with the donors. This concerns specially the funds of the European Union.
The management of employment expenses is also facilitated by the increased possibility to transform vacant 
position and to move positions inside and between ministries. 
The changes  in  this  context  are  linked to  a  desire  to  reduce the wage component  of  the budget  which 
represented in 1996 forty percent of total expenditure and 10.7 percent of GDP (see Table 3A, 3B). The goal 
is to diminish the amount of salaries expenditure to 9.2 percent of GDP.
3. Other related changes
As mentioned in section III the changes in the allocation of funds to local governments is an important step 
toward a greater efficiency in the use of funds. The reduction in the arbitrary allocation of funds among local 
government should permit a better redistribution of funds to the localities that needs them the most and the 
increase in the decision autonomy should allow for a better choice of projects to be funded.
Another related change is the reform of the way bids for government projects are conducted and monitored. 
This  permits  a  greater  degree  of  transparency  and,  if  some  problems  remain,  has  already  influenced 
significantly the outcome of the bids.
There is an increased recognition in Morocco of the problem of corruption and its detrimental impact on the 
economy. The government is making the fight against corruption one of its priority and this will help reduce 
the problem.
V. ASSESSMENT OF BUDGET INSTITUTION BEFORE AND AFTER THE
1998 REFORM
1. Methodology
As mentioned above the paper uses the questionnaire developed by Hadi Esfahani (1999) to document factual 
information  about  Morocco’s  budgetary  procedures.  Based  on  the  answers  to  the  questionnaire,  indices 
measuring how effective budget institutions are in maintaining fiscal discipline are constructed. This fiscal 
discipline has ideally to be reached while achieving both allocative and technical efficiency in the budget 
process and indices evaluating these two aspects are also given.
The questionnaire includes 42 questions, 24 of which concern aggregate discipline, 10 allocative efficiency 
and 8 technical efficiency. The score on each question ranges between 0 and 1 with a score closer to 1 
representing a greater degree of effectiveness of the budget procedures. A detailed description is given in 
Esfahani (1999).
The  answers  concerning  Morocco  were  obtained  from  various  studies  and  official  publications  of  the 
Kingdom Ministry  of  Finance,  from the  personnel  involved  in  various  stages  of  the  process  and  from 
available data. The answers that could not be found in existing documentation or legal sources were obtained 
through interviews of
at least three employees. The data given in Table 10 to 18 is obtained from the
Ministry of Finance, various reports of Bank al Maghrib and from the IMF Morocco
statistical appendix (1998).
2. Results of the Assessment of Budget Institutions
A. Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
In Morocco the budget process is highly dominated, before the legislative stage by the central budget agency, 
here the Budget Office. At the level of governments, before the writing of the draft budget law ministers 
agree on the general features of the budget.
Furthermore at the legislative stage, constitutional rule forbids amendments that either increase deficit or 
spending.  This  has  permitted  a  sharp  reduction  of  the  budget  deficit,  once  this  was  decided  by  the 
government.  The  scores  for  the  aggregate  budget  discipline  are  relatively  high  on  most  institutional 
arrangements, except for the macroeconomic program. The latter’s score is low before 1998 because the 
budget process was guided by an annual plan and also after 1998 because the program only provides a basis 
for budget discussions in the year in which it is drafted. When the effectiveness characteristics are analyzed, 
the budget scores low on the comprehensiveness of the budget, on ex-post restraints, on accountability and 
on the education level of decision makers.
Ex-ante Agreements
The ex-ante constraints are "laws, social norms, constitutional clauses and the like that restricts the decision 
powers of policy makers and predetermine certain budgetary outcomes by placing bounds on spending or 
deficits" (Esfahani 1999).
In Morocco the debt and deficit limits imposed by international agreements and constitutional requirements 
restricting amendments to those that will not raise the expenditure or reduce the revenues have been very 
effective in lowering the budget deficit. However, as mentioned earlier, this result has been obtained mainly 
through a stagnation of investment expenditure and through the provision of poor social services (see Table 
3A, 3B).
The effectiveness of the ex-ante constraints is reduced because of the government political commitment to 
subsidization of food prices, the large share of wages in the total expenditures, the non accountability of 
policy makers for the budget outcome (the reglement law is published with delays and the government audit 
results are not published) and the absence of sanctions. The size of the SOE also lowers this effectiveness 
through the non reduction of current subsidies (see Table 4 and 5).
The multi-annual macro economic plan is expected to improve the effectiveness of the ex-ante constraints but 
it has only recently been reintroduced and its impact on the budget law, if we exclude a more clear perception 
of the macro-economic goal, is not clear since it does not imply any financial commitment.
Coordination mechanism
To  achieve  coordination,  the  Moroccan  budget  uses  both  ex-ante  agreements  among  cabinet  ministers 
concerning the global characteristics of the budget and delegation of responsibility to the Ministry of Finance 
for the design and implementation of the budget.
In Morocco the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is reputed to have "too much power". The MOF holds bilateral 
negotiations with other ministries but his view dominates. This is reinforced by the fact that information is 
most  often  lacking.  In  Morocco as  in  other  developing countries  the Minister  of  Finance  has  a  greater 
authority than other ministries. This power is reinforced by the fact that the legislature can not make changes 
that would either increase or decrease the deficit.
The ex-ante agreement that prevails in Morocco is the acceptation by the cabinet of the broad aspects of the 
budget law before any bilateral negotiations are held. This does not mean that there are no disagreement 
possible as ministers discuss global internal and external conditions before setting the global framework for 
the budget  law.  For  the 1999-2000 budget  law for  example,  inside the government  we could find both 
proponents of a rigorous policy and proponents of larger deficits.
Effectiveness characteristics of aggregate fiscal discipline institutions
The weakness of the score concerning the budget comprehensiveness stems from the large size of the SOE 
and their exclusion from the BL. In particular the investment made by the SOE does not appear in the BL and 
the wages of workers appear only when the SOE does not have sufficient funds to cover the wages. The local 
government budget appear also in the State’s budget only insofar as thirty percent of VAT receipts were 
transferred from the State to the local government. Furthermore the funds set aside for accrual appropriations 
and unforeseen expenses were used relatively freely until the 1998 reform.
The delays in ex-post reconciliation, the absence of sanctions, the unavailability of information have a strong 
negative impact on the accountability score. The improvement in the score after the reform results from the 
assumption made in  the  study that  the  commitment  of  the  budget  office  to  the  catching up on ex-post 
reconciliation is successful.  The computerization program underway for more than a decade (Al Maliya, 
1998) and the progressive assimilation of the use of computers by the personnel should render information 
more easily and more quickly available. 
The low score for the ex-post restraint results from the fact that the budget law allowed credit overrun in the 
case of debt payments and salaries expenses. Also it is accepted that nominal salaries can not decrease in the 
public sector. The overrun for salaries expenditure which was permitted until 1998, is not allowed anymore. 
This has led to an increase in the score for ex-post restraints after the reform.
The expected tenure of central  budget agency heads is relatively high.  Since independence we had nine 
budget agency heads, which makes for an average tenure of more than four years. The budget directorate is 
well endowed with staff with appropriate education level as sixty percent of them have at least four years of 
higher education (Al Maliya, 1998) .
The  score  for  the  hard  budget  constraint  is  relatively  high  because  the  public  enterprise  and  the  local 
collectivities do not usually get the government warranty to borrow and do not have the possibility to be 
bailed out by the government in case of difficulty.
The score on the autonomous segment of the budget is high since there is no real commitment for salary 
increases and for social spending. The government allows for some automatic adjustment in some categories 
of public expenditure. There is an implicit commitment in Morocco that nominal salaries may not decline but 
no commitment to employ any determined group in the population. There has however been some pressure 
for the employment of doctorat holders.
B. Allocative Efficiency
The score forthe allocative efficiency are very low, both before and after the reform. The main institutional 
mechanism that can reduce the adverse effects that delegation and ex-ante agreements can have on allocative 
efficiency are: prioritization through objective criteria, participation of line agencies in planning, flexibility 
of line ministries and breadth of consultation. The performance of these allocation mechanism is affected by 
a number of factors. 
The use of cost  benefit  analysis in the assessment of programs and activities is used very little and the 
national development plan has only recently been reintroduced. The use of objective criteria is not effective 
because sanctions are absent and accountability weak. This should improve after the reform of la Cour des 
Comptes as reports will become public and accountability will increase. Other factors that are detrimental to 
prioritization is  that  the agencies  can  write  their  capital  budget  without  specifying how this  will  affect 
operational costs and that no ex-post performance evaluations are undertaken on major programs. The budget 
personnel is however now trying to push for a closer link between the two.
The line agencies do not participate in the planning process and this is reflected in the score obtained. The 
role of the line agencies has changed somehow after the reform. The flexibility of the line ministries over the 
use of funds has globally decreased after the reform.
The consultation of groups other than the line agencies exist in Morocco, however its efficacy is still low and 
did not change after the reform.
The overall score of allocative efficiency, if it improved after the reform is still very insufficient. Even if 
consultation exists,  the process lacks accountability and the line ministries are absent from the planning 
stage.
C. Technical Efficiency
The salaries in the administration in Morocco are lower than the ones of the private sector. Various studies 
(among which those published by La Vie Economique) compare the salaries for equivalent education and 
responsibility. If the private sector pays only slightly higher salaries at the beginning of employment, the 
difference increases with tenure.  The security and condition of employment  in the civil  service are  still 
attractive and the government is able to recruit good professionals. However the little room for promotion is 
not conducive to increased performance. 
The agency autonomy is very low even if it has been reinforced with the introduction of the SEGMA and can 
be expected to increase.
The overall score for technical efficiency is low and has not been changed by the reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall the structure of the Moroccan budget and the institutional framework in which it operates influenced 
significantly the outcome of the stabilization policy of the 1980’s. In fact the institutional framework has 
allowed the government to significantly control the budget deficit without sufficient regards to allocationnal 
and technical efficiency. The 1998 new organic law has reinforced the ability of the government to continue 
the pursuit of the existing policy even if some claim that it  has mainly put into law practices that were 
already in effect.
In  fact  the 1998 reform has permitted an improvement  in the effectiveness of  the budget  process.  This 
improvement is very small and concerns essentially the aggregate fiscal discipline and to a lesser extend the 
allocative  efficiency.  The  change  does  not  appear  to  be  sufficient  to  face  the  challenges  awaiting  the 
Moroccan economy and further efforts will be required.
Further  improvement  can  be  obtained  from actions  that  are  relatively  "easy"  to  implement  such  as  the 
increase in the availability and diffusion of information. Other required actions will be more difficult to put 
into effect such as the introduction of explicit sanctions for poor performance.
The various reforms that the government plans to undertake will address some but not all of the changes 
required to improve efficiency in a significant way.
The rehabilitation of the Plan offers an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of the budget process and to 
correct some of the weaknesses such as the participation of line agencies in planning. Even if efficiency 
improvement is highly desirable and necessary, one of the constraint that will remain for some time, unless 
new  sources  of  revenues  are  found,  is  the  very  limited  amount  of  resources  available  once  the 
"incompressible" expenditures are met.
 
*This paper has greatly benefited from the information and support I have received from Hadi Salehi Esfahani of the University of 
Iilinois at Urbana- Champaign. I am very gratefull to Clive Gray of HIID and Berrada Abdelkader of Mohamed V University for 
extensive comments on an earlier  draft.  The paper benefited greatly from the information and explanations given by Ahmed 
Essaghir, Adjunct to the Budget Director, Bennani, Adjunct to the Budget Director, Abdelaziz Adnane, head of staff of the social 
sectors section of the Budget Directorate, Zoheir Chorfi and Bouami of the Treasury Directorate.
 
End Notes
1  The Zekat was levied on herd and money,  the Achour was levied on productive land and based on harvest  and fruits  the 
sovereignty taxes are the Djezya, the kharadj, the naïba, the Harka, la Mouna, la Sokhra, la Ghorama, la Dheïra. The Djezya was 
paid by conquered nations not converted to Islam; the Kharadj was paid by conquered nation for the right to cultivate their land; 
the Naïba was a tax used to pay extraordinary expenses due to war; the Harka was the amount asked by the Sultan to a tribe when 
he was undertaking an expedition; the Mouna was the provision of food to the armed forces of the Sultan; the Sokhra was a 
comission paid to a civil servant who was staying in the tribe; the Ghorana was the amount a tribe had to pay if a theft or crime 
occured on the tribe territory ; the Dheïra was fine for an offense.
2 Tertib is a tax on agricultural revenues. It means "arrangement" and it aims at fiscal reform by the removal of religious taxes. It  
was replaced after independence by an agriculture tax.
3 The Constitution is available on the Moroccan Ministry of Communication Site :
http://www.mincom.gov.ma
4 Charte Communale of 1976
5 Art 5 of the Dahir n° 1-76-584 of 30/9/1976 dealing with the organization of local governments finances.
6 Dahir n°1-85-347 of December 20, 1985
7  Circulaire du Ministére de l’Interieur n°/DFL of 4-1-1996 relative to the preparation of the local governments budgets for the 
transitory period going from January 1996 to June 1997.
8 The French quotations throughout the text have been freely translated to English.
9 Article 64 of the Royal Decree of 1967 on public accounting .
10 Decree of December 30, 1975 relative to the CED.
11 The B.O is organized as follows. The Budget Director has one General adjunct Director and three other adjunct directors. The 1st 
one is charged with the coordination of the sectoral and synthesis structure. It includes the following departments : the agricultural 
and subsides, social infrastructure, productive sectors, administrative and coordination & synthesis. The second one is charged with 
the coordination of the staff structures, of local finance, of normalization, information system and human resource. It includes the 
following departments :  state,  state owned enterprise and local government employees,  local  finance, normalization of public 
expenses and information system. The Third one is responsible for the coordination of the structures of the public project finances. 
It includes the following departments : multilateral financing and bilateral and regional finance.
12 Al Maliya : Bulletin d’Information du Ministére des Finances, du Commerce, de l’Industrie et de l’Artisanat. N°12 available at 
the Ministry of Finance site http://www.mfie.gov.ma
13 A new prime Minister, formally in the opposition was nominated March 14 1998.
14 In Morocco since independence, rectificatory laws were voted in 1971, 1979, 1983, 1990 and 1994.
15  Within  the  parliament  12  committees  exist,  the  finance  committee  being  the  most  powerful  one.  The  actual  number  of 
representatives in the commission is calculated on the basis of the representativeness of each parliamentary group in parliament. It 
has to be between 15 and 54.
16 As of December 1999 the reglement law published in the Bulletin Officiel is the 1992 reglement law.
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